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Résumé / Abstract
On modélise un oligopole hétérogène : les firmes ont des coûts différents et
des paramètres de pollution différents. On montre que les taux de taxes optimales
imposées sur les émissions ne sont pas les mêmes. On appelle cette propriété la
pénalisation sélective. Il existe donc un conflit entre l’équité et l’efficacité. Le résultat
principal de notre article est Le Théorème de la Distorsion Optimale. La structure des
taxes optimales exige que les firmes aux coûts les plus élevés paient les taxes les plus
élevées. Un autre résultat s’appelle le Théorème sur le motif pro-concentration.
In this paper, we consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly: firms have
different production costs, and their pollution characteristics may also be different.
We will demonstrate that, in this case, optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not
the same for all firms. We call this property ``selective penalization'', or ``favoritism
in penalties.'' Thus, the ``efficiency'' objective may be served only at the expense of
``fairness'. One of our main results is the Optimal Distortion Theorem.. We show that
even in the case w here the rates of emission per unit of output are identical for all
firms, the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a higher tax rate on
emissions. Our result implies that the efficient tax structure favors the efficient firms,
but the magnitude of the favors is a decreasing function of the marginal cost of public
fund. Another characterization of optimal tax structure is our Pro-concentration
Motive Theorem. Optimal taxes penalize the inefficient firms more, and thus increases
the concentration of the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl index. In fact, we
show that the variance of the distribution of the firms' tax-inclusive marginal costs
after the imposition of efficient taxes exceeds the variance that would be obtained if
there were no taxes. We call this  the Magnification Effect: the variance of marginal
costs is magnified by a factor which depends on the marginal cost of public fund.
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11. Introduction
When production generates pollution as a by-product, competitive
…rms over-produce in the sense that marginal social cost exceeds price.
Under perfect competition, a Pigouvian tax equal to marginal damage
cost is called for. This rule applies whether …rms are identical or
not. Thus, under perfect competition, all polluting …rms are treated
fairly by a regulator that seeks to achieve e¢ciency: the tax rate per
unit of emission is the same for all …rms, even under heterogeneity of
production costs. When the market is not competitive1, however, as
we will show below, it is no longer true that e¢ciency can be achieved
by a uniform tax rule.
In this paper, we consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly: …rms
have di¤erent production costs, and their pollution characteristics may
also be di¤erent. We will demonstrate that, in this case, optimal tax
rates per unit of emission are not the same for all …rms. We call this
property “selective penalization”, or “favoritism in penalties.” Thus,
the “e¢ciency” objective may be served only at the expense of “fair-
ness.” We do not propose to resolve the issue of fairness, or equity,
here. Our objective is to analyze the direction of “favoritism in penal-
ties”: how the e¢ciency-inducing …rm-speci…c tax structure depends
on the structure of (heterogenous) production costs, and heterogenous
pollution-output ratio. We wish to determine which types of …rms (low
cost, or high cost …rms) should be penalized more.
Asymmetry is important, because it is a prevalent real world fea-
ture, and because it introduces another source of distortion: in a
Cournot equilibrium, marginal production costs are not equalized across
…rms, resulting in production ine¢ciency at any given total output.
1Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) have shown that the optimal tax per unit
of emission under monopoly is less than the marginal damage cost (and it can be
negative). Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), consider the case of a symmetric
polluting oligopoly (i.e., they assume that …rms are identical) and show that if the
number of …rms is endogenous and if there are …xed costs, the optimal Pigouvian
tax could exceed the marginal damage cost, because free entry may result in an
excessive number of …rms.
2In this context, pollution taxes or pollution standards must seek to
remedy both the environmental problem and the intra-industry pro-
duction ine¢ciency problem. With asymmetric oligopoly, the regu-
lator would want to be able to correct distortion on a …rm-speci…c
basis. While de jure di¤erential treatments to …rms in the same in-
dustry (in the sense that di¤erent standards apply to di¤erent …rms),
may be politically unacceptable in most economies, de facto di¤eren-
tial treatments (e.g., di¤erent degrees of enforcement and veri…cation)
may be feasible. In what follows, whenever the terms “…rm-speci…c
tax rates”, or “…rm-speci…c pollution standards” are used, they should
be interpreted in the de facto sense.
The objective of this paper two-fold. Our …rst aim is to charac-
terize the structure of optimal …rm-speci…c emission tax rates, and
to provide an intuitive explanation of our results on di¤erential treat-
ments. Here, we go a step further than just establishing the conditions
for unequal treatment of equals, which have been provided elsewhere
(Salant and Scha¤er, 1996, 1999, Long and Soubeyran, 1997a,b, 2001).
We fully characterize the direction of bias. Our second aim is to high-
light the con‡ict between e¢ciency and equity. We show that, in the
case of taxation, …rms that are equally polluting (i.e., their emissions
per unit of output are identical) may be taxed di¤erently, when their
production costs are di¤erent. In a sense, this is inequitable. In the
case where regulation is by means of pollution standards, we again
show a con‡ict between e¢ciency and equity: e¢ciency may require
that di¤erent standards be imposed on ex-ante identical …rms.
One of our main results is the Optimal Distortion Theorem. We
show that even in the case where the rates of emission per unit of
output are identical for all …rms, the e¢cient tax structure requires
that high cost …rms pay a higher tax rate on emissions. Our result
implies that the e¢cient tax structure favors the e¢cient …rms, but
the magnitude of the favors is a decreasing function of the marginal
cost of public fund. More generally, we de…ne the Pigouvian distor-
tion for …rm i as the di¤erence between the tax rate on its output and
3the adjusted2 marginal pollution damage caused by an extra unit of
its output, and show that the optimal Pigouvian distortion for …rm
i is greater than that for …rm j, if and only if the marginal social
cost of …rm i is greater than that of …rm j. (Marginal social cost is
the sum of marginal production cost and adjusted marginal damage
cost.) Another characterization of optimal tax structure is our Pro-
concentration Motive Theorem. Optimal taxes penalize the ine¢cient
…rms more, and thus increases the concentration of the industry, as
measured by the Her…ndahl index. In fact, we show that the vari-
ance of the distribution of the …rms’tax-inclusive marginal costs after
the imposition of e¢cient taxes exceeds the variance that would be
obtained if there were no taxes. We call this the Magni…cation Ef-
fect : the variance of marginal costs is magni…ed by a factor which
depends on the marginal cost of public fund. From a mathematical
point of view, our result has a nice geometric interpretation: We show
that optimal taxes can be obtained as a solution of minimizing the
distance between a hyperplane and a reference point. Our approach
is an application of the duality theory using conjugate function and
inf-convolution.
Our main focus in on …rm-speci…c taxation on emissions. A brief
section on …rm-speci…c standards is included to show the general ap-
plicability of our method3.Our derivation of optimal taxes and optimal
standards (in slightly di¤erent models) shows that there is a uni…ed
framework for analyzing …rm-speci…c penalties.
In the models we present below, we use a two-stage game frame-
work. In the …rst stage, the regulator sets …rm-speci…c emission taxes
or standards. In the second stage, …rms compete in the …nal good
market. To …x ideas, we focus on the case where …rms produce a
2An adjustment factor is applied to account for the marginal cost of public
fund.
3We do not seek to compare taxes to standards, because there exists already
a large literature on that subject. In fact, the model we develop to analyze opti-
mal standards is quite di¤erent from the model we use to analyze optimal taxes,
and therefore it would not make sense to discuss, using our results, the relative
attractiveness of these two policy measures.
4homogenous good, and compete à la Cournot. However, our analysis
can easily be adapted to deal with other cases, such as Bertrand com-
petition with di¤erentiated products, spatial competition (as in the
Hotelling model), and even markets in which some …rms are Stackel-
berg leaders.
The games considered in this paper belong to the class of games
called “cost manipulation games with costs of manipulating”(see Long
and Soubeyran, 2001a). The regulator uses the chosen policy instru-
ment to a¤ect, on a discriminatory basis, the marginal costs of in-
dividual …rms. This in turn a¤ects their equilibrium outputs and
market shares. The costs of manipulating can take di¤erent forms. In
the case of taxation, when the marginal cost of public funds exceeds
unity4, these costs include the loss of tax revenue when the regulator
changes the tax structure In the case of standards, …rms are induced
to acquire costly equipment to reduce the pollution generated by their
production process. Such equipment alters the marginal production
costs.
We are able to provide a uni…ed treatment of …rm-speci…c pollution
policies because we transform variables in such a way that all modes
of intervention (in distinct models of emission generation) can be seen
to have the same basic structure. We show that maximizing the …rst
stage objective with respect to one of the environmental instruments
(such as Pigouvian taxes, speci…c pollution standards, tradable pollu-
tion permits) is equivalent to choosing the Cournot equilibrium quan-
tities. This is because the discriminatory use of policy instruments in
the …rst stage amounts to the same thing as manipulating the mar-
ginal costs of production which in turn a¤ect second-stage equilibrium
outputs.
2. Selective Penalization by Pigouvian Taxes
In this section present our basic model of an asymmetric pollut-
ing oligopoly, and derive the optimal …rm-speci…c Pigouvian taxes.
4See Ballard et al. (1985) for estimates of the marginal cost of public …nance.
5Here, our major task is to show how the optimal …rm-spec…c taxes
are related to the structure of heterogenous costs and heterogenous
emission-output ratios. Our main results are summarized in Proposi-
tion ODT (Optimal Distortion Theorem). According to this theorem,
in a oligopoly consisting of …rms with non-identical costs, the optimal
Pigouvian tax for each …rm must deviate from its adjusted marginal
damage per unit of output, and such deviations vary among …rms:
the deviation should be the greatest for the most ine¢cient …rm, and
lowest for the most e¢cient …rms. In general, ine¢cient …rms are
penalized more, relative to e¢cient …rms.
2.1. The basic model
We consider a polluting oligopoly consisting of n non-identical
…rms producing a homogenous …nal good. Let I = f1; 2; :::; ng: The
total output of the …nal good is Q =
P
i2I qi. The inverse demand
function for the …nal good is P = P (Q) where P 0(Q) < 0. In this
model, emission is proportional to output: ei(qi) = "iqi. In general,
"i 6= "j. This is the …rst source of heterogeneity. Firm i has pro-
duction cost ci(qi). The subscript i in ci(:) indicates that in general
…rms are heterogenous also in production cost. Firms sell their good
in the same market place, but they are located at di¤erent points. We
represent this third source of heterogeneity (distance from the central
market place) by assuming that …rm i must incur a transport cost di
per unit of output (in general di 6= dj). We assume that …rm i must
pay a tax ti per unit of its emission. (The regulator must set the tax
rates optimally.) Th pro…t function is
¼i = P (Q)qi ¡ ci (qi) ¡ ti²iqi ¡ diqi
We de…ne
¿ i ´ ti"i (1)
so that ¿ i is the tax per unit of output of …rm i. It is convenient to
de…ne !i ´ di + ¿ i. The pro…t function becomes
¼i = P (Q)qi ¡ Ci(qi; !i)
6where Ci(qi; !i) is the (tax-inclusive) total cost function:
Ci(qi; !i) ´ !iqi + ci (qi)
The (tax-inclusive) average variable cost function is:
½i(qi; !i) = !i +
ci (qi)
qi
(2)
and the (tax-inclusive) marginal cost function is
µi(qi; !i) = !i + c0i(qi) (3)
The di¤erence between µi and ½i , de…ned as ri, measures the degree
of convexity of the cost function. We have
ri = µi ¡ ½i = c0i(qi) ¡ ci(qi)qi
If ci(:) is linear, then ri equals zero identically. If ci(:) is strictly convex,
then ri is positive for all zi > 0.
We will show how the government can optimally manipulate the
tax-inclusive costs of the …rms so as to maximize social welfare. To
do this, we set up the problem as a two-stage game. In the …rst stage,
the government sets …rm-speci…c taxes, and in the second stage, …rms
compete as Cournot rivals, taking tax rates as given. As usual, to
solve for the optimal taxes, we must …rst analyse the equilibrium of
the game in stage two.
2.2. Stage two: Cournot equilibrium given tax rates
The …rst order condition for an interior equilibrium for …rm i is
@¼i
@qi
= P 0(Q)qi + P (Q) ¡ µi = 0; i 2 I (4)
We assume that these conditions determine a unique5 Cournot equilib-
rium ( bQ; bqi,i 2 I); where the hat over a symbol indicates that it is the
5For assumptions ensuring existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, see Long
and Soubeyran (2000).
7Cournot equilibrium value. It is convenient to express the equilibrium
output of …rm i as a function of the equilibrium output of the industry,
and of the parameters of …rm i’s (tax-inclusive) cost function:bqi = bqi( bQ;!i) (5)
Inserting (3) and (5) into (4), we obtain
P 0( bQ)bqi( bQ;!i) + P ( bQ) = !i + c0i hbqi( bQ;!i)i (6)
Summing (6) over all i, we obtain the identity
P 0( bQ) bQ+ nP ( bQ) = n!I + X
i2I
c0i
hbqi( bQ;!i)i (7)
where !I ´ (1=n)Pi2I !i. Equation (7) indicates that the equilibrium
output can be determined from the knowledge of the !i’s. Given the
!i’s, we assume that there exists a unique bQ that satis…es (7). (See
Long and Soubeyran (2000) for su¢cient conditions for uniqueness).
Thus we writebQ = bQ(!) (8)
where ! ´ (!1; !2; :::; !n):
We now express the equilibrium pro…t of …rm i as follows
b¼i = ³ bP ¡ b½i´ bqi = h³ bP ¡ bµi´ + ³bµi ¡ b½i´i bqi
= [¡cP 0]bq2i + bri(bqi)bqi
= [¡cP 0]bq2i + bqic0i(bqi) ¡ ci(bqi) (9)
where we have made use of the Cournot equilibrium conditionbP ¡ bµi = [¡cP 0]bqi (10)
Expression (9) deserves some comments. Since the pro…t expres-
sion in (9) incorporates the Cournot equilibrium condition (10), it in-
dicates that, in the …rst stage of the game, while the government can
8manipulate the bqi and bQ via the choice of the policy parameters ¿ i, it
cannot violate the Cournot equilibrium condition. (Technically, this
is very much like the incentive compatibility constraint in principal-
agent problems: the principal cannot ignore economic agents’ equi-
librium conditions.) We now turn to a complete analysis of the …rst
stage of the game.
2.3. The …rst stage: optimization by the government
The objective of the government is to maximize a weighted sum of
pro…ts, consumers’ surplus, and tax revenue, minus the damage cost
caused by pollution. The weight given to consumers’ surplus is ¯ > 0.
The weight ° ¸ 1 is a measure of the marginal cost of public fund. We
will restrict attention to the empirically relevant range of ° :1· ° · 2
(see Ballard et al. (1985) for discussion, and for estimates of ° for the
US economy). Thus, welfare is
W =
X
i2I
¼i + ¯S + °
X
i2I
tiei ¡D(E), where 1 · ° · 2, (11)
where E =
P
i2I ei , D(E) is the damage cost, and S is the consumers’
surplus
S =
Z Q
0
P ( eQ)d eQ¡ P (Q)Q
In what follows, we assume that the damage cost function is linear,
D(E) = ¾E > 0. We de…ne the adjusted marginal damage per unit of
output of …rm i as follows:
±i ´ ¾"i=° (12)
Here, the adjustment factor is 1=° · 1. The di¤erence between ¿ i, the
optimal tax per unit of …rm i’‘s output, and ±i, its adjusted marginal
damage per unit of output, will be called the optimal distortion for …rm
i. We will show that (i) if …rms are identical, the optimal distortions
are equal for all …rms, and (ii) if …rms are heterogenous, the optimal
9distortions are no longer equal: higher cost …rms will be penalized
more, relative to lower cost …rms.
The social welfare at a Cournot equilibrium may be written ascW = X
i2I
b¼i + ¯S( bQ) + °X
i2I
(¿ i ¡ ±i)bqi( bQ;!i) (13)
where bQ = bQ(!) and b¼i is given by (9). Note that the …rst term
on the right-hand side of (13) contains tax payments by …rm (in the
expression b¼i) and the third term contains social value of tax revenue
°¿ ibqi. These two tax terms do not cancel each other out when ° 6= 1.
From expression (13), we see that welfare can be maximized by
an appropriate choice of the …rm-specic tax rates ¿ i. However, as we
demonstrate below, it is analytically much more convenient to solve
the welfare maximization problem by using the equilibrium outputsbqi as choice variables, and afterward infer the optimal taxes. The two
methods yield the same solution. We now transform variables so that
the ¿ i’s are no longer explicitly present in the objective function. We
will below how to replace the ¿ i’s in (13) by equilibrium quantities.
From the equilibrium condition (4),cP 0bqi + bP = di + ¿ i + c0(bqi)
we get
¿ i ¡ ±i = bqicP 0 + ( bP ¡ di ¡ ±i) ¡ c0(bqi) (14)
Substituting (14) into (13), we getcW = F ( bQ) ¡ X
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ) (15)
where
F ( bQ) ´ ¯S( bQ) + ° bP bQ (16)
fi(bqi; bQ) ´ (di + ±i)°bqi + (° ¡ 1)[¡cP 0]bq2i + Ái (17)
10
Ái ´ (° ¡ 1)bqic0i(bqi) + ci(bqi)
Note that for given bQ, fi is strictly convex in bqi if ° > 1, c00i ¸ 0 and
c000i ¸ 0: Expression (15) shows that welfare is directly dependent on
the bqi’s. The tax rates do not (explicitly) appear in this expression.
Thus cW can be maximized by the direct choice of the equilibium
outputs. Afterwards, the taxes can be inferred from (14).
We have thus obtained a very useful lemma:
Lemma 1: In the welfare maximization problem, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between determining …rm-speci…c emission tax
rates to maximize welfare, expression (13), and determining Cournot
equilibrium outputs to maximize welfare, expression (15).
We note that taxing …rms is a way of manipulating their marginal
costs. Thus, our Pigouvian taxation problem lies within the framwork
of the “cost manipulation approach” that we have explained in our
previous work (Long and Soubeyran, 1997a, 1997b, 2001a).
2.4. A benchmark case: perfect competition
Before solving for optimal emission taxes in an asymmetric oligopoly,
it is useful to consider a benchmark case, with perfect competition.
We assume in this subsection that the marginal cost of public fund is
unity, ° = 1, and the weight given to consumers’ surplus is also unity,
¯ = 1. In this case, we obtain the well-known formula for optimal tax
¿ i = ±i, i.e., ti = ¾ for all i 2 I. (see Appendix A1 for details.)
Thus, under perfect competition, all …rms are treated equally. (We
will later show that this “equal treatment” result does not apply to
the oligopoly case.) Even though this result is well known, it is useful
for future reference to state it as a proposition:
Proposition 1: (Benchmark Pigouvian Tax: fair treat-
ment)Under perfect competition, the optimal Pigouvian tax ti (per
unit of emission) is the same for all …rms and equal to the marginal
damage ¾:
ti = ¾ for all i 2 I: (18)
11
Thus all …rms are treated fairly.
Recall that by de…nition, ¿ i = "iti. Thus, proposition B1 implies
that, under perfect competition, the optimal tax per unit of output is
¿Bi = ¾"i where the superscript B indicates the optimal value for the
benchmark case.
2.5. An oligopoly with constant marginal cost
Now we turn to the case of an oligopoly with constant marginal
cost: ci(qi) = ®iqi. (The increasing marginal cost case is treated in
section 4.) In this case, (17) becomes
fi(bqi; bQ) ´ (di + ±i + ®i)°bqi + (° ¡ 1)[¡cP 0]bq2i (19)
We de…ne the marginal social cost of …rm i’s output as
si ´ di + ±i + ®i (20)
Thus, marginal social cost consists of production cost, ®i, transport
cost, di, and adjusted marginal damage, ±i.
We consider two sub-cases: (a) ° = 1 and (b) ° > 1.
2.5.1. Sub-case (a): ° = 1
In this sub-case, the marginal cost of public fund is unity. It is easy
to show that the optimal policy is to design taxes so that only the …rm
with the lowest marginal social cost will produce. (See Appendix A2).
2.5.2. Sub-case (b): ° > 1
In this sub-case, (17) becomes
fi(bqi; bQ) ´ (di+ ±i+®i)°bqi+(°¡ 1)[¡cP 0]bq2i ´ aibqi+ b( bQ)bq2i (21)
12
where ai ´ °si is the weighted marginal social cost of …rm i’s output,
and
b( bQ) ´ (° ¡ 1)[¡cP 0]:
For given bQ, the function fi(bqi; bQ) is quadratic and strictly convex inbqi. A very e¤ective way to characterize the optimal outputs is to use
the following two-step procedure. (See Appendix A2).
Our result can be summarized as follows:
(i) The optimal industry output is given by eQ which is the solu-
tion of the following …rst order condition (please see Appendix A2 for
details):
F 0( bQ) ¡ aI ¡ 1nb0( bQ) bQ2 ¡ 2nb( bQ) bQ¡ b0( bQ)4b2( bQ) Xi2I (ai ¡ aI)2 = 0
(ii) The optimal output for …rm i is
eq¤i = ¸
³ eQ´ ¡ ai
2b( eQ) for all i 2 I (22)
where ¸
³ eQ´ is given by:
¸
³ eQ´ = aI + 2nb( eQ)Q eQ
and this implies that the optimal …rm-speci…c tax rate …rm i is given
by
e¿ i = eq¤iP 0( eQ) + (P ( eQ) ¡ di) ¡ ®i (23)
where eq¤i is given by 22
(iii) Let
¢i ´ e¿ i ¡ ±i (24)
13
denote the gap between the optimal …rm-speci…c output tax ¿ i under
oligopoly and the adjusted damage cost ±i . Then
¢i = eq¤iP 0( eQ) + P ( eQ) ¡ si = (2 ¡ °)si2(° ¡ 1) + P ( eQ) ¡ ¸
³ eQ´
2(° ¡ 1) (25)
We thus can state:
Proposition 2: (Selective penalization) For any pair of …rm
(i; j), we have
¢i ¡ ¢j = (e¿ i ¡ ±i) ¡ ( e¿ j ¡ ±j) = 2 ¡ °2(° ¡ 1) (si ¡ sj) : (26)
Proof:This follows from equation 25
To understand the formula (26), consider …rst the special case
where "i = "j, so that the marginal damage per unit of output is
the same for both …rms ±i = ±j: Then, if si < sj, the optimal selective
tax rates are such that e¿ i < e¿ j, provided 1 < ° < 2. That is, the more
e¢cient …rm pays a lower tax rate if 1 < ° < 2. However, note that
(2 ¡ °)=2(° ¡ 1) is a decreasing function of °; therefore the gap e¿ i¡e¿ j becomes narrower as ° increases (because with a greater °, revenue
considerations become more important, and therefore the government
increases the tax rate on the bigger …rms). When ° = 2, the tax rates
are equal6.
The intuition behind proposition1 is as follows. Recall that in an
oligopoly with …rms having di¤erent production costs, it is in general
not optimal to tax …rms equally for their pollution. This is because
the Pigouvian taxes now serve two purposes: correction for pollution
externalities, and correction for market power and for production in-
e¢ciency (because oligopolists do not equalize marginal production
costs among themselves) while taking into account the marginal cost
of public funds ( ° > 1.) We now seek to characterize the optimal
departure from the benchmark Pigouvian taxes ±i obtained in Propo-
sition1.
6For ° > 2; the more e¢cient …rm must pay a higher tax rate. Recall that in
our speci…cation of the welfare function, we exclude the case ° > 2:
14
From (67) in the appendix, at the optimal solution, the taxes are
such that the more e¢cient …rms (those …rms with low si) always
produce more than the less e¢cient ones. The quantity ¢i measures
the deviation of optimal …rm-speci…c tax under oligopoly from the
…rm-speci…c marginal damage cost caused by a unit of output of …rm
i. Recall that in this section we assume that 2 > ° > 1 (to be in line
with the empirical estimation of the marginal cost of public fund by
Ballard et al.,1985) and that ci(z) = ®iz. We will call ¢i the optimal
Pigouvian distortion for …rm i.
We now characterize the deviation of ¢i from the industry average
¢I . From (26),
¢i ¡ ¢I = 2 ¡ °2(° ¡ 1) (si ¡ sI) (27)
where si is the marginal social cost of …rm i’s output. This result
shows that the e¢cient tax structure favors the e¢cient …rms, but
this favor falls as ° increases.
From this, we can compute the variance of the statistical distribu-
tion of the Pigouvian distortions:
V ar¢ =
·
2 ¡ °
2(° ¡ 1)
¸2
V ar [s] (28)
Proposition 3: (Optimal distortion theorem)
Optimal Pigouvian distortions (the gaps between optimal tax and
adjusted marginal damage) are not equalized in a heterogeneous oligopoly.
In the empirically relevant range of the marginal cost of public …nance
°, i.e., for 1 < ° < 2, if the marginal social cost si of …rm i is greater
than the industry average, the Pigouvian distortion for …rm i will be
greater than average Pigouvian distortion. The optimal tax structure
penalizes ine¢cient …rms.
The variance of the distribution of the Pigouvian distortions is
given by (28), and it is a decreasing function of °.
Remark: In the rather extreme case where ° > 2 (which is un-
likely from empirical data) if the marginal social cost si of …rm i is
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greater than the industry average, the Pigouvian distortion for …rm
i will be smaller than average Pigouvian distortion. It remains true
that the optimal solution implies that the more e¢cient …rms have
greater outputs, see (67).
The Optimal Distortion Theorem provides a link between the ex-
ante heterogeneity of the oligopoly’s cost structure and the ex-post
dispersion of the …rm-speci…c Pigouvian tax rates.
3. Further Interpretation
Our results on …rm-speci…c pollution taxes can be given an inter-
esting geometric interpretation (see the Projection Theorem below)
and an industrial organization interpretation (see the Concentration
Motive Theorem below).
3.1. A geometric interpretation: the Projection Theorem
We now provide a geometric interpretation of the optimal choice of
outputs. Consider the …rst step in the two-step procedure explained
in section 2.5.2. That step is equivalent to the program of choosing
the bqi (i 2 I) to
min
X
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ)
subject to
P
i2I bqi = bQ (given) and bqi positive. This step can be
described by the following Projection Theorem.
Proposition 4 (Projection Theorem) The determination of
the optimal composition of industry output is equivalent to choosing
a vector bq ´ (bq1; :::; bqn) from an n ¡ 1 dimensional simplex S so as
to minimize the distance between the vector bq and a reference vector
q¤ ´ (q¤1 ; :::; q¤n ) where
q¤i ´ ¡ ai2b( bQ) (29)
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and where
S ´ fbq ¸ 0 : X
i2I
bqi = bQg
Proof:
fi(bqi; bQ) = aibqi + b( bQ)bq2i = b( bQ) ·³bqi + ai2b´2 ¡ a2i4b2
¸
= b
h¡bqi ¡ q¤i ¢2 ¡ ¡q¤i ¢2i
ThusX
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ) = bkbq¡ q¤k2 ¡ bX
i2I
¡
q¤i
¢2
where the second term on the right-hand side depends only on bQ,
which is …xed, and the …rst term on the right-hand side is b times
the square of the distance of the point bq in the set S (which is an
n¡simplex) to the given point q¤. Given bQ, both b and q¤ are …xed.
It follows that the …rst step (62) of the program is equivalent to …nding
the minimal distance between bq and the given point q¤:
The optimal eq which achieves the minimal distance kbq ¡ q¤k is
the projection of q¤ on the n¡simplex S. Its components are given
by
eqi = eqI ¡ 1
2b( bQ)(ai ¡ aI) (30)
which is (66). Figure 1 illustrates the case n = 2. The projection eq
satis…es
eq = q¤ + (eqI ¡ q¤I )u
where u =(1; 1; :::; 1) where q¤I = ¡ aI2b( bQ) .
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3.2. The Concentration Motive
Our result shows that …rm-speci…c Pigouvian taxes in a pollut-
ing oligopoly serve two functions: the usual function of correcting for
externalities, and the function of correcting for production e¢ciency,
while taking into account the marginal cost of public funds. For this
second function, the optimal tax vector depends on two elements (i)
the degree of unit-cost asymmetry in the oligopoly, and (ii) the cost
of public fund. The …rst element is measured by the variance of the
statistical distribution of unit costs before and after taxation (this
variance is related to the Her…ndahl index.) The second element is
measured by ° and re‡ects the trade-o¤ between pro…ts and tax rev-
enue.
Does the optimal Pigouvian tax structure increase or decrease the
concentration of the industry? Before answering this question, it is
necessary to examine the relationships among the variance of the dis-
tribution of the unit costs, the Her…ndahl index of concentration, in-
dustry pro…t, and welfare. We now state a number of lemmas con-
cerning these relationships. First, recall that the Her…ndahl index of
concentration is
H = X
i2I
·
qi
Q
¸2
Given that there are n …rms, this index attains its maximum value
(H = 1) when one …rm produces the whole industry’s output and the
remaning n¡1 …rms produce zero output, and it attains its mimimum
value (H = 1=n) when each of the n …rms produces qi = Q=n. Now all
…rms will produce the same amount of output if they have the same
tax-inclusive marginal costs.
Lemma 2: For a given output level bQ; the Cournot equilibrium
industry pro…t is an increasing function of the Her…ndahl index of
concentration.
Proof: Recall that at a Cournot equilibrium, …rm i’s pro…t ise¼i = [¡cP 0]bq2i + bqic0i(bqi) ¡ ci(bqi) With ci(qi) = ®iqi, the industry pro…t
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is b¦ = X
i2I
e¼i = h¡ bP 0i bQ2 bH + constant
where
bH = X
i2I
· bqibQ
¸2
(31)
Lemma 3: Given the output level bQ, the Her…ndahl index of
concentration is an increasing function of the variance V ar(bµ) of the
distribution of the tax-inclusive marginal costs in a Cournot equilib-
rium.
bH = 1
n
2641 + V ar(bµ)h
(¡ bP 0)bqIi2
375 ¸ 1n (32)
Thus any policy that maximizes [respectively, minimizes] the variance
of the distribution of tax-inclusive marginal costs will maximize [re-
spectively, minimizes] the concentration of the industry, and, for a
given bQ, maximizes the pro…t of the industry.
Proof:
From (4),
bqi = bP ¡ bµi
(¡ bP 0) (33)
we obtainX
i2I
bq2i = X
i2I
1
(¡ bP 0)2 h( bP ¡ bµI) ¡ (bµi ¡ bµI)i2
=
1
(¡ bP 0)2
"
n( bP ¡ bµI)2 + X
i2I
(bµi ¡ bµI)2#
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=
1
(¡ bP 0)2
·
n
³
(¡ bP 0)bqI´2 + nV ar(bµ)¸ (34)
The result (32) follows from (34) and (31).
We now can state an important result: with ° > 1, the optimal tax
structure increases the concentration of the industry. (See proposition
CM below for a precise statement.) This means ine¢cient …rms are
penalized more, relative to e¢cient …rms. Recall that for the case
° = 1, in section 2.5.1, at the social optimum, only the …rm with
the lowest social cost (s) will produce, giving rise to the maximum
level of industry concentration (i.e., the Her…ndahl index will take on
its highest possible value, 1). Here, with 2 > ° > 1, tax revenue
is an important consideration, and hence there is a tradeo¤ between
productive e¢ciency and tax revenue. It is still the case that the
optimal tax structure increases the Her…ndahl index, by increasing
the variance of the distribution of tax-inclusive marginal costs. We
call this the Magni…cation e¤ect :The magni…cation factor, denoted by
-(°), is de…ned by
-(°) ´
·
°
2(° ¡ 1)
¸2
> 1 for 2 > ° > 1 (35)
This magi…cation factor is a decreasing function of °. As ° approaches
the value 2, the magi…cation factor falls to 1.
Proposition 5 (A pro-concentration motive theorem)
Assume that all …rms have the same emission coe¢cients: ²i = ²
for all i. Given 2 > ° > 1, the optimal …rm-speci…c Pigouvian tax
structure increases the variance of the statistical distribution of tax-
inclusive marginal costs within the oligopoly relative to the variance of
the statistical distribution of pre-tax marginal costs7. The relationship
between the two variances is given by:
V ar(eµ) = -(°)V ar(µ0) (36)
7In the empirically unlileky case where ° > 2; replace “increases” by “de-
creases”.
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where µ0i = di + ®i is the equilibrium marginal cost of …rm i in a
Cournot equilibrium where all the taxes are zero, and where
Proof: First, note that if all the taxes are zero, then
µ0i ¡ µ0I = (di ¡ dI) ¡ (dI + ®I) (37)
Recall that bqi denote the equilibrium Cournot output of …rm i given
an arbitrary vector of …rm-speci…c taxes, and eqi is the equilibrium
Cournot output of …rm i when the taxes are optimized. From (66),
and (33), which is true also when the tilda replaces the hat,
eqi ¡ eqI = ¡(eµi ¡ eµI)h¡ eP 0i = ¡ (ai ¡ aI)2(° ¡ 1) h¡ eP 0i
Henceeµi ¡ eµI = °2(° ¡ 1) [(di + ®i) ¡ (dI + ®I) + (±i ¡ ±I)] (38)
Thereforeeµi ¡ eµI = °2(° ¡ 1) £(µ0i ¡ µ0I) + (±i ¡ ±I)¤
V ar(eµ) = · °
2(° ¡ 1)
¸2 £
V ar(µ0) + V ar± + 2cov(µ0; ±)
¤
(39)
If ²i = ² for all i, then, in view of (1) and (12), (39) reduces to (36).
Note that -(°) > 1 if 1 < ° < 2.
Remark: The intuition behind the pro-concentration motive the-
orem is as follows. If ±i = ± for all i, the marginal cost of public fund
is within the empirically likely range (1 < ° < 2), then, for any given
industry output level, the optimal …rm-speci…c tax structure increases
the variance of marginal costs (from V ar(µ0) to -(°)V ar(µ0)) by tax-
ing more e¢cient …rms at a lower rate, see (26), because this helps the
lower cost …rms to expand output relative to the higher cost …rms, and
as a result improves productive e¢ciency. However, if ° is great, the
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tax revenue becomes a very important consideration, and it becomes
optimal to tax more e¢cient …rms at a higher rate, so as to generate
more revenue. Take for example the case of a duopoly, where …rm 2
has higher production cost. For a given level of industry output bQ, we
must maintain t1 + t2 = constant, say 2¹t. From an initial assignment
(t1; t2) = (¹t; ¹t), consider deviation of t2 from ¹t, say t2 = ¹t + ·, and
hence t1 = ¹t¡ ·. An increase in · yields marginal gain in production
e¢ciency, because the same level of industry output bQ is produced,
but the lower cost …rm increases its output and the higher cost …rm
reduces its output. However, an increase in · by ¢· implies reduced
tax revenue, by approximately (bq1 ¡ bq2)¢·;(plus the e¤ect of induced
changes in composition of industry output) and this implies increased
distortion cost, approximately (° ¡ 1)¢·(bq1 ¡ bq2). For a given ° > 1,
the optimal deviation ·¤ is at the point where the marginal gain in
productive e¢ciency is equated to the marginal increase in distortion
cost. Clearly, a higher ° shifts the marginal distortion cost upwards,
implying a smaller ·¤.
4. Selective Penalization under Non-linear Costs
We now examine the the case where ci(zi) is strictly convex. To
simplify the exposition, we assume that the marginal cost of public
fund is unity: ° = 1. In this case, the functions fi(bqi; bQ) become
fi(bqi; bQ) = (di + ±i) bqi + ci (bqi) = gi(bqi)
The …rst stage of the game can be solved in two steps: In step (i), we
solve
maxbqi cW = F ³ bQ´ ¡ X
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ)
where
F
³ bQ´ ´ ¯S( bQ) + bQP ( bQ) (40)
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subject toX
i2I
bqi = bQ
where bQ is given, and qi ¸ 0. In step (ii), we determine the optimalbQ.
To solve step (i), we form the Lagrangian
bL = F ³ bQ´ ¡ X
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ) + ¸"X
i2I
bqi ¡ bQ#
or bL = F ³ bQ´ ¡ ¸ bQ+ X
i2I
h
¸bqi ¡ fi(bqi; bQ)i
We obtain the …rst order conditions
@fi
@bqi = di + ±i + c0i(bqi) = ¸
hence
eqi = cxi (¸¡ di ¡ ±i)
where cxi (:) is the inverse function of c0i(:). Then eqi(¸) = cxi (¸¡di¡±i).
The equation
P
i2I eqi(¸) = bQ determines a unique ¸( bQ).
The second step: We now determine the optimal bQ. We follow the
duality method used in Rockafellar (1970). Following Rockafellar, we
de…ne the conjugate function
f ¤i (¸; bQ) = supbqi
h
¸bqi ¡ fi(bqi; bQ)i
then
f ¤i (¸; bQ) = ¸eqi(¸) ¡ fi(eqi(¸); bQ)
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It follows that the optimal value of the Lagrangian (optimized with
respect to the bqi) iseL( bQ) = hF ( bQ) ¡ ¸( bQ) bQi + X
i2I
f ¤i (¸( bQ); bQ)
Di¤erentiating eL( bQ) with respect to bQ and equating it to zero yields
F 0( bQ) ¡ bQ d¸
d bQ ¡ ¸( bQ) + X @f ¤i@¸ d¸d bQ + X @f ¤i@ bQ = 0 (41)
Since
@f ¤i
@¸
= eqi(¸) + ·¸¡ @fi@bqi
¸
@eqi
@¸
= eqi(¸)
(41) reduces to
F 0( bQ) ¡ bQ d¸
d bQ ¡ ¸( bQ) + Xi2I eqi(¸( bQ)) d¸d bQ = 0
or
F 0( bQ) ¡ ¸( bQ) = 0 (42)
This equation determines the optimal eQ.
Now, from (40)
F 0( bQ) = bP ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) h¡ bP 0i bQ (43)
From (42) and (43),
bP ¡ ¸ = (1 ¡ ¯) h¡ bP 0i bQ (44)
.
The di¤erence between the optimal per unit tax and the marginal
damage is given by
¿ i ¡ ±i = eP + eP 0eqi ¡ [(di + ±i) + c0i(eqi)]
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But, recall that
(di + ±i) + c0i(eqi) = ¸ (45)
Therefore
¿ i ¡ ±i =
h eP ¡ ¸i + eP 0eqi (46)
From (44) and (46),
¢i = ¿ i ¡ ±i =
h
¡ eP 0i eQ ·(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ eqieQ
¸
(47)
Thus
¢i ¡ ¢j = (¿ i ¡ "i¾) ¡ (¿ j ¡ "j¾) =
h
¡ eP 0i (eqj ¡ eqi)
From (47) we can state the following proposition
Proposition 6: (Optimal Pigouvian Distortion under Strictly
Convex Costs and ° = 1)
Under strictly convex cost, the optimal tax structure favors lower
cost …rms.
Remark: Under linear cost, if ° = 1, the optimal tax structure
will eliminate all ine¢cient …rms (only the lowest cost …rm will sur-
vive). Under strictly convex cost, such extreme penalization does not
emerge; rather, all …rms will produce, but the more e¢cient …rms are
more favorably treated.
Thus the speci…c Pigouvian tax ti on pollution by …rm i is
ti ´ ¿ i²i = ± +
1
"i
S 0( eQ) ·(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ eqieQ
¸
(48)
We conclude that (i) ti is greater, the greater is the marginal damage
cost, (ii) ti is negatively related to the weight attached to consumers’
surplus, and (iii) in equilibrium, among all …rms that have the same
emission coe¢cient "i, smaller …rms are taxed at a higher rate. This
is because smaller …rms are less e¢cient, and optimal policy seeks to
reduce their outputs.
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It is easy to generalize the result to the case where …rm i has ui
identical plants. Thus, let zi = qi=ui and denote cost at the plant level
by ci(zi). Then optimal policy also favors …rms with more plants. To
see this, consider two …rms, say …rm i and …rm j with di = dj, ±i = ±j,
and the same cost function at the plant level, i.e., ci(:) = cj(:). Then,
equation (45), appropriately modi…ed, gives ezi = ezj. It follows that
ui > uj then eqi > eqj, and therefore, from (48), …rm i will pay less
tax per unit of output than …rm j. Intuitively, this is because, at the
…rm level, …rm i has a lower marginal cost curve. It is in this sense a
more e¢cient …rm, and accordingly it is better treated. (This happens
only under oligopoly; under perfect competition, both …rms would be
taxed at the same rate.)
Corollary: Firms with more plants will be more favorably treated.
5. Pollution Standards and Abatement Costs
We now turn to a model in which …rms can reduce emission at any
given output level, by incurring abatement costs (which is a function
of both the output level and the emission level). We will focus on the
use of …rm-speci…c pollution standards.
We assume that for a given pollution standard ei (the maximum
level of emission that …rm i is allowed), the cost of output qi is
Ai(ei; qi) = ai(ei)v(qi) (49)
with ai(ei) > 0 for all ei ¸ 0, a0i(ei) < 0, a00i (ei) ¸ 0, v0(qi) > 0,
v00(qi) ¸ 0, and v(0) = 0. Thus Ai is convex in both arguments, and
Ai(ei; 0) = 0:Then …rm i’s pro…t is
¼i = qiP (Q) ¡ ciqi ¡ Ai(qi; ei) (50)
We assume that the regulating agency speci…es an amount ei (i.e.,
maximum pollution per period) that …rm i must not exceed. We take
it that the …nes for violation are su¢ciently high to ensure perfect
compliance. It follows that if the …rm wants to produce quantity qi
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then it must spend the amount Ai(ei; qi). We call ei the “…rm-speci…c
emission standard” set by the regulatory agency.
We wish to determine the optimal con…guration of …rm-speci…c
standards that maximizes social welfare, given the constraints that
…rms are oligopolists.
We now show that welfare can be increased by setting non-identical
…rm-speci…c standards.
Given ei, …rm i’s marginal cost of production is ci + ai(ei)v0(qi)
Then, if Q^ is the Cournot equilibrium industry output, …rm i’s equi-
librium output satis…es
q^iP 0(Q^) + P (Q^) = ci + ai(ei)v0(q^i) ´ µi (51)
where µi is …rm i’s marginal cost at a Cournot equilibrium. We will
exploit the following equilibrium relationship between ei and q^i; for a
given Q^ :
ai(ei) =
P 0(Q^)q^i + P (Q^) ¡ ci
v0(q^i)
(52)
That is,
ei(q^i; Q^) = a¡1i
"
q^iP^ 0 + P^ ¡ ci
v0(q^i)
#
(53)
Thus in equibrium, …rm i’s abatement cost is
ai(ei)v(q^i) =
[P 0(Q^)q^i + P (Q^) ¡ ci]q^i
´(q^i)
(54)
where ´(q^i) is de…ned as the elasticity of v(qi): ´(qi) = qiv0(qi)=v(qi).
Equilibrium pro…t of …rm i is, from (50) and (54),
¼^i = q^ifP^ ¡ cig + f[¡P^ 0]q^i ¡ (P^ ¡ ci)g[q^i=´(q^i)]
= (P^ ¡ ci)
·
1 ¡ 1
´ (q^i)
¸
q^i + [¡P^ 0] q^
2
i
´(q^i)
(55)
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Industry pro…t in equilibrium is
¦^ =
X
i
¼^i = Q^2[¡P^ 0] bH + X
i
(P^ ¡ ci)
·
1 ¡ 1
´ (q^i)
¸
q^i
where bH is a “modi…ed Her…ndahl index” of concentration:
bH = X
i2I
q^2i
´(q^i)Q^2
We can express social welfare ascW = ¯S(Q^) ¡ X
i2N
fi(q^i; Q^) (56)
where
f(q^i; Q^) ´ ¡[P (Q^) ¡ ci]
·
1 ¡ 1
´ (q^i)
¸
q^i
+P^ 0
q^2i
´(q^i)
+ ¾ei(q^i; Q^) (57)
For any given Q^, the regulator can choose the q^i’s to maximize
social welfare subject to
P
i2I q^i = Q^: An interesting property of the
social welfare function (56) is that, under certain reasonable assump-
tions, it is convex in the q^i’s, for a given Q^: For example, we obtain
this convexity property if v(q) = q, a(e) = B ¡ e where B > 0, and
P (Q) = 1 ¡Q. We can now the following proposition.
Proposition 7: When pollution abatement cost is of the form
given by (49), optimal standards satisfy the following properties:
(i) If the social welfare function is concave in the q^i’s, the optimal
…rm-speci…c pollution standards are
ei = a¡1i "eqi eP 0(Q^) + eP (Q^) ¡ civ0[eqi]
#
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(ii) (Unequal treatment of equals): If the social welfare func-
tion (56) is convex in the q^i’s, the optimum choice of the q^i’s is achieved
by giving non-identical treatments to identical …rms.
Remark: For lack of space, we do not present results on the direc-
tion of bias here. Some examples are provided in Long and Soubeyran
(2001b). Similar results apply to the case of tradeable permits, see
Long and Soubeyran (2000).
6. Concluding remarks
We have characterized the optimal structure of penalties for pol-
luting …rms in an oligopoly with heterogenous costs. We have shown
that there is a bias in favor of e¢cient …rms. In achieving e¢ciency,
a structure of systematic biases emerges.
Our paper goes beyond the existing result of unequal treatment
to ex ante identical …rms. Several important insights emerge. It is
shown that optimal …rm-speci…c regulations are partly driven by the
motive to increase the industry concentration, because increased con-
centration can enhance productive e¢ciency. However, tax revenue
can be an important consideration, and any increase in the marginal
cost of public funds would lead to an increased tax rate on the more
e¢cient …rms. The degree of industry concentration is increased by
the structure of e¢cient taxes.
Our analysis can be extended to study the role of strategic trade
policy in the presence of a polluting international oligopoly. There
are a number of insightful papers that deal with this topics (Conrad
(1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1996), Ulph
(1996a,b), Neary (1999)). However, the optimal structure of taxes
was not explored in these papers, because the models did not allow
for asymmetry within the domestic industry, and …rm-speci…c taxes
or standards were ruled out.
APPENDIX A1
The benchmark case: perfect competition.
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Perfect competition means that each …rm thinks that its output
has no e¤ect on the price, i.e., the term P 0(Q) does not appear (i.e., is
assigned the value zero) in the …rm’s …rst order condition. Therefore
(14) reduces to
¿ i = bP ¡ di ¡ c0(bqi) (58)
With ° = ¯ = 1 social welfare (15) becomescW = S( bQ) + bP bQ¡ X
i2I
[(di + ±i)bqi + ci(bqi)] (59)
Writing bQ = Pi2I bqi and maximizing (59) with respect to the bqi’s, we
obtainbP ¡ di ¡ ±i ¡ c0i(bqi) = 0 (60)
which says that marginal social cost of …rm i’s output must be equated
to price, a standard result. From (60) and (58), we get ¿ i = ±i, and
hence, using (1) and (12),
ti =
¾
°
´ ± for all i 2 I (61)
(where ° = 1) that is, the tax per unit of pollutant discharged by …rm
i is equal to the marginal damage cost.
APPENDIX A2
Oligopoly with constant marginal cost.
Subcase (a):° = 1 :
Without loss of generality, assume s1 < s2 < s3 < ::: < sn. Then,
if @cW=@bq1 = F 0( bQ) ¡ s1 = 0 it must be true that, for all j > 1,
@cW=@bqj = F 0( bQ) ¡ sj = s1 ¡ sj < 0, implying that bqj = 0. It follows
that at the social optimum, only …rm 1 produces.
An intuitive explanation of this result is as follows. Suppose that
at an equilibrium both …rms 1 and 2 produce positive outputs, and
they satisfy the Cournot equilibrium conditions
P ( bQ) + P 0( bQ)bq1 = d1 + ®1 + ¿1
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and
P ( bQ) + P 0( bQ)bq2 = d2 + ®2 + ¿2
Then, social welfare can be increased by raising ¿2=[¡P 0( bQ)] by ¢ > 0
and reducing ¿ 1=[¡P 0( bQ)] by ¢, so that …rm 1’s output will increase
by ¢ and …rm 2’s output will fall by ¢, leaving industry output and
price unchanged. Social welfare increases because the total cost of
producing the given output bQ is now lower. Tax revenue will change,
but industry pro…t, de…ned as sales revenue, minus production cost,
minus tax payment) will change by the same amount, therefore, given
that ° = 1, the tax revenue change does not matter.
Subcase (b) ° > 1
The two-step procedure:
In step 1, we …x an arbitrary level of industry output, bQ; and
maximize welfare by choosing the bqi’s subject to the constraint thatP
i2I bqi = bQ. This gives the optimal value of bqi, conditional on the
given bQ . In the second step, we determine the optimal industry
output.
Step 1:
Given bQ, we write the Lagrangian as
L = F ( bQ) ¡ X
i2I
fi(bqi; bQ) + ¸"X
i2I
bqi ¡ bQ# (62)
From this we obtain the conditions
¡ai ¡ 2b( bQ)eqi + ¸ = 0; for all i 2 I (63)
where eqi denotes the optimal value of bqi, conditional on the given bQ.
From (63),
eqi = ¸¡ ai
2b( bQ) for all i 2 I (64)
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Summing (64) over all i, we obtain an expression showing that ¸ is
uniquely determined by bQ
¸ = e¸( bQ) = aI + 2nb( bQ) bQ (65)
where aI ´ (1=n)Pi2I ai. Substituting (65) into (64), and lettingbqI ´ bQ=n, we get
eqi( bQ) = bqI ¡ 1
2b( bQ) [ai ¡ aI ] for all i 2 I (66)
This equation gives us:
Lemma 2: The optimal deviation of the output of …rm i from
average industry output is a linear function of the deviation of its
marginal social cost from the industry average.
Remark: To illustrate, consider a pair of …rms (1; 2) with mar-
ginal social costs s1 < s2. Then (66) gives
eq1( bQ) ¡ eq2( bQ) = °
2(° ¡ 1)[¡cP 0] [s2 ¡ s1] (67)
That is, the solution of the optimization problem has the property
that the …rm with higher marginal social cost produces less than the
…rm with lower marginal social cost. Note that, for a given bQ, a
greater ° implies a smaller gap between eq1 and eq2, but this gap is
always positive and greater than [s2 ¡ s1]=2[¡cP 0]. This may be ex-
plained as follows: a greater ° implies that a greater weight is given
to tax revenue. Thus, for any given bQ, a marginal increase in ° would
increase the government’s desire to increase tax revenue at the cost of
reduced productive e¢ciency (here, productive e¢ciency includes not
only private cost considerations, but also environmental cost). The
government would therefore raise ¿ 1 by some small amount ² > 0 and
at the same time reduce ¿ 2 by ² , thus leaving total output bQ constant.
The increase in tax revenue is approximately (eq1 ¡ eq2)² and this must
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be balanced against the marginal loss in productive e¢ciency asso-
ciated with the increase in the output of the high-cost …rm and the
reduced output of the low-cost …rm.
Step 2:
Using the results in step 1, we are now ready to …nd the optimal
industry output. We make use of the fact that the optimal value of
the Lagrangian, given bQ, is equal to the maximizedW , given bQ. Thus
eL( bQ) = F ( bQ) ¡ e¸( bQ) bQ+ X
i2I
f¤i
he¸( bQ); bQi
where
f ¤i (¸; bQ) ´ sup
qi
¸bqi ¡ fi(bqi; bQ)
(f¤i (¸; bQ) is called the conjugate function of fi(bqi; bQ), see Rockafellar,
1970, section 12.) In the present case,
f ¤i (¸; bQ) = [aI + 2bbqI ] eqi ¡ £aieqi + beq2i ¤
= ¡(ai ¡ aI)eqi ¡ b [eqi ¡ bqI]2 + bbq2I
Thus, using (66)
f ¤i (¸; bQ) = ¡(ai ¡ aI)bqI + bbq2I + 14b( bQ)(ai ¡ aI)2
and, using (65), the maximized welfare, for given bQ, is
fW ( bQ) = F ( bQ) ¡ "aI + 2b( bQ) bQn
# bQ
+nb( bQ)Ã bQ
n
!2
+
1
4b( bQ) Xi2I (ai ¡ aI)2
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HencefW ( bQ) = F ( bQ) ¡ aI bQ¡ 1nb( bQ) bQ2 + 14b( bQ) Xi2I (ai ¡ aI)2 (68)
Maximizing (68) with respect to bQ, we get the necessary condition
F 0( bQ) ¡ aI ¡ 1nb0( bQ) bQ2 ¡ 2nb( bQ) bQ¡ b0( bQ)4b2( bQ) Xi2I (ai ¡ aI)2 = 0
This equation determines the optimal value of bQ, which we denote byeQ. The optimal output for …rm i is
eq¤i = ¸
³ eQ´ ¡ ai
2b( eQ) for all i 2 I (69)
From this, we derive the optimal …rm-speci…c tax e¿ i, using (14):e¿ i = eq¤iP 0( eQ) + (P ( eQ) ¡ di) ¡ c0(eq¤i ): (70)
where eq¤i is given by 69
APPENDIX A3
The Duality Approach
The following is the outline of the duality approach contained in
Rockafellar (1970). Consider the problem
max
xi
J = F (X) ¡ X
i2I
fi(xi; X)
subject toX
i2I
xi = X, xi ¸ 0; i 2 I
whereX is given, fi(xi;X) convex with respect to xi and di¤erentiable
with respect to (xi;X), and proper ( fi(xi; X) is never ¡1, and is not
identically +1).
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To solve this problem, de…ne the extended functions gi(xi; X) =
fi(xi; X) if xi ¸ 0 and gi(xi;X) = +1 if xi < 0. Then we have the
program
max
xi
J = F (X) ¡ X
i2I
gi(xi; X)
subject toX
i2I
xi = X, i 2 I
For agiven X; the Lagrangian of this problem is
L(x; ¸;X) = [F (X) ¡ ¸X] + X
i2I
[¸xi ¡ gi(xi; X)]
where x = (x1; :::; xn).
The saddlepoint duality theorem (see Rockafellar, 1970, pp 284-5)
states that ex = (ex1; :::; exn) is an optimal solution of the program if
and only if (i) given e¸, ex maximixes the function L(x; e¸; X), and (ii) e¸
minimizes L(ex(¸;X); ¸;X) with respect to ¸, where ex(¸;X) achieves
the minimum of L(x; ¸;X) for each given ¸.
The determination of exi(¸;X) is given by the …rst order condition
of the program
sup
xi
[¸xi ¡ gi(xi;X)] = g¤i (¸;X)
g¤i (¸;X) is called the conjugate function of gi(xi;X). We have
@g¤i
@¸
= exi(¸;X) + ·¸¡ @gi@xi
¸
@ exi
@¸
= exi(¸;X)
We also haveeL = L [ex(¸;X); ¸;X] = [F (X) ¡ ¸X] + X
i2I
g¤i (¸;X)
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and e¸(X) = e¸ achieves the minimum of eL with respect to ¸. The …rst
order condition for that isX
i2I
@g¤i
@¸
(e¸; X) = X
that is,X
i2I
exi(¸;X) = X
This equation gives e¸(X). The optimal exi follows: exi(X) = exi he¸(X); Xi ;
i 2 I:
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